┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    AUDIT REPORTS INDEX                           │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                  │
│  Trail of Bits - Core Engine (September 2024)                   │
│  ├── Report: /audits/trail-of-bits-2024-09.pdf                 │
│  ├── Scope: Order matching, risk engine, settlement            │
│  └── Key Finding: Integer overflow in price calculation        │
│                                                                  │
│  OpenZeppelin - Smart Contracts (October 2024)                  │
│  ├── Report: /audits/openzeppelin-2024-10.pdf                  │
│  ├── Scope: DEX contracts, bridge contracts, governance        │
│  └── Key Finding: Reentrancy in withdrawal flow                │
│                                                                  │
│  Halborn - Bridge Infrastructure (November 2024)                │
│  ├── Report: /audits/halborn-2024-11.pdf                       │
│  ├── Scope: BridgeVM, ThresholdVM, MPC protocols               │
│  └── Key Finding: Missing signature validation in relay        │
│                                                                  │
│  NCC Group - Cryptography (December 2024)                       │
│  ├── Report: /audits/ncc-group-2024-12.pdf                     │
│  ├── Scope: Dilithium, Kyber, Ringtail implementations         │
│  └── Key Finding: Timing side-channel in key derivation        │
│                                                                  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

# Standard Audit Scope Template
scope:
  repositories:
    - github.com/luxfi/dex        # Core DEX
    - github.com/luxfi/node       # Blockchain node
    - github.com/luxfi/threshold  # MPC library
    - github.com/luxfi/contracts  # Smart contracts

  components:
    critical:
      - Order matching engine
      - Price calculation
      - Settlement logic
      - Withdrawal processing
      - Bridge signing
      - MPC key management

    high:
      - API authentication
      - Rate limiting
      - Oracle integration
      - Risk calculations

    medium:
      - Logging and monitoring
      - Configuration management
      - Error handling

  exclusions:
    - Test files
    - Documentation
    - Development tooling
    - Third-party dependencies (separate audits)

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    AUDIT METHODOLOGY                             │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                  │
│  Phase 1: Code Review (40% of time)                            │
│  ├── Manual line-by-line review                                │
│  ├── Architecture analysis                                     │
│  ├── Threat modeling                                           │
│  └── Attack surface mapping                                    │
│                                                                  │
│  Phase 2: Automated Analysis (20% of time)                     │
│  ├── Static analysis (Semgrep, CodeQL)                        │
│  ├── Fuzzing (go-fuzz, AFL)                                   │
│  ├── Symbolic execution                                        │
│  └── Dependency scanning                                       │
│                                                                  │
│  Phase 3: Dynamic Testing (30% of time)                        │
│  ├── Penetration testing                                       │
│  ├── Protocol fuzzing                                          │
│  ├── Race condition testing                                    │
│  └── Economic attack simulation                                │
│                                                                  │
│  Phase 4: Reporting (10% of time)                              │
│  ├── Finding documentation                                     │
│  ├── Severity classification                                   │
│  ├── Remediation recommendations                               │
│  └── Executive summary                                         │
│                                                                  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

## [HIGH] Reentrancy Vulnerability in Withdrawal Flow

### Description
The `withdraw()` function in `Vault.sol` makes an external call to transfer
tokens before updating the user's balance, enabling reentrancy attacks.

### Location
- File: `contracts/Vault.sol`
- Lines: 145-162
- Function: `withdraw(uint256 amount)`

### Impact
An attacker can drain the vault by recursively calling `withdraw()` before
the balance update. Maximum loss: Entire vault balance.

### Proof of Concept
```solidity
contract Attacker {
    Vault vault;

    function attack() external {
        vault.withdraw(vault.balanceOf(address(this)));
    }

    receive() external payable {
        if (address(vault).balance > 0) {
            vault.withdraw(vault.balanceOf(address(this)));
        }
    }
}

function withdraw(uint256 amount) external {
    require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount, "Insufficient balance");

    // Effect: Update state before interaction
    balances[msg.sender] -= amount;

    // Interaction: External call last
    (bool success, ) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}("");
    require(success, "Transfer failed");
}

## Bug Bounty Program

### Program Overview

### Reward Calculation

```python
def calculate_reward(severity: str, impact: str, likelihood: str) -> int:
    """
    Calculate bug bounty reward based on severity and context.

    Impact levels: critical, high, medium, low
    Likelihood: certain, likely, possible, unlikely
    """

    base_rewards = {
        'critical': 100000,
        'high': 25000,
        'medium': 5000,
        'low': 1000
    }

    impact_multipliers = {
        'critical': 10.0,  # Direct fund loss
        'high': 5.0,       # Significant financial risk
        'medium': 2.0,     # Limited financial impact
        'low': 1.0         # No direct financial impact
    }

    likelihood_multipliers = {
        'certain': 2.0,    # Guaranteed exploitation
        'likely': 1.5,     # High probability
        'possible': 1.0,   # Moderate probability
        'unlikely': 0.5    # Low probability
    }

    base = base_rewards.get(severity, 0)
    impact_mult = impact_multipliers.get(impact, 1.0)
    likelihood_mult = likelihood_multipliers.get(likelihood, 1.0)

    reward = base * impact_mult * likelihood_mult

    # Cap at maximum
    return min(int(reward), 1000000)

## Bug Bounty Submission Template

### Title
[Brief description of the vulnerability]

### Severity Assessment
- **Severity**: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
- **Impact**: [Description of potential damage]
- **Likelihood**: [Certain/Likely/Possible/Unlikely]

### Affected Components
- Repository: [github.com/luxfi/...]
- File(s): [specific files]
- Version/Commit: [commit hash or version]

### Description
[Detailed technical description of the vulnerability]

### Steps to Reproduce
1. [First step]
2. [Second step]
3. [...]

### Proof of Concept
[Working PoC code or detailed attack scenario]

### Impact Analysis
[What an attacker could achieve, potential losses]

### Suggested Fix
[Optional: Your recommended remediation]

### Additional Information
- [ ] I have not disclosed this publicly
- [ ] I discovered this independently
- [ ] I consent to my username being credited

### Contact
- HackerOne username: [username]
- Preferred contact: [email or HackerOne]

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│               RESPONSIBLE DISCLOSURE TIMELINE                    │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                  │
│  Day 0:    Vulnerability reported                               │
│            └── Acknowledgment within 24 hours                   │
│                                                                  │
│  Day 1-3:  Initial triage                                       │
│            └── Severity assessment, scope determination         │
│                                                                  │
│  Day 4-7:  Detailed analysis                                    │
│            └── Root cause identification, fix development       │
│                                                                  │
│  Day 8-14: Fix implementation                                   │
│            └── Code changes, internal review                    │
│                                                                  │
│  Day 15-21: Testing & deployment                                │
│            └── Testnet deployment, verification                 │
│                                                                  │
│  Day 22-30: Mainnet deployment                                  │
│            └── Staged rollout, monitoring                       │
│                                                                  │
│  Day 30+:  Public disclosure                                    │
│            └── Advisory published, reporter credited            │
│                                                                  │
│  Note: Critical vulnerabilities may have accelerated timeline   │
│                                                                  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

# Security Advisory: LX-2024-001

## Summary
A reentrancy vulnerability in the withdrawal flow could allow
attackers to drain vault funds.

## Severity
**HIGH** - CVSS 8.1

## Affected Versions
- lx-dex v1.0.0 - v1.2.3

## Fixed Versions
- lx-dex v1.2.4+

## Description
The `Vault.withdraw()` function made external calls before updating
internal state, enabling reentrancy attacks. An attacker with any
deposited balance could drain the vault.

## Mitigation
Upgrade to v1.2.4 or later. If immediate upgrade is not possible,
pause withdrawals until upgrade is complete.

## Timeline
- 2024-10-15: Vulnerability reported via HackerOne
- 2024-10-16: Acknowledged, triage started
- 2024-10-18: Fix developed
- 2024-10-20: Fix deployed to testnet
- 2024-10-25: Fix deployed to mainnet
- 2024-10-30: Public disclosure

## Credit
Thanks to @security_researcher for responsible disclosure.

## References
- [HackerOne Report #123456](https://hackerone.com/reports/123456)
- [GitHub Advisory](https://github.com/luxfi/dex/security/advisories/GHSA-xxxx)
- [CVE-2024-XXXXX](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-XXXXX)

# Pre-deployment Security Checklist
code_review:
  - [ ] All changes reviewed by security team
  - [ ] No hardcoded secrets or credentials
  - [ ] Input validation on all user inputs
  - [ ] Output encoding for XSS prevention
  - [ ] SQL injection prevention (parameterized queries)
  - [ ] CSRF tokens implemented
  - [ ] Rate limiting configured

smart_contracts:
  - [ ] Reentrancy guards applied
  - [ ] Integer overflow/underflow checks
  - [ ] Access control verified
  - [ ] Events emitted for state changes
  - [ ] Gas limits considered
  - [ ] Upgrade path tested (if applicable)

cryptography:
  - [ ] Approved algorithms only (no homebrew crypto)
  - [ ] Proper key derivation functions
  - [ ] Secure random number generation
  - [ ] Constant-time comparisons
  - [ ] Keys stored securely

infrastructure:
  - [ ] TLS 1.3 required
  - [ ] HSTS enabled
  - [ ] Security headers configured
  - [ ] Firewall rules reviewed
  - [ ] Logging enabled
  - [ ] Alerts configured

# CI/CD Security Pipeline
security_pipeline:
  static_analysis:
    - tool: semgrep
      config: p/security-audit
      fail_on: error

    - tool: gosec
      rules: all
      fail_on: high

    - tool: slither # For Solidity
      detectors: all
      fail_on: high

  dependency_scanning:
    - tool: dependabot
      frequency: daily

    - tool: snyk
      severity_threshold: high

  secret_scanning:
    - tool: gitleaks
      fail_on: any

    - tool: truffleHog
      entropy_threshold: 4.5

  dynamic_testing:
    - tool: owasp-zap
      target: staging
      frequency: weekly

  fuzzing:
    - tool: go-fuzz
      targets:
        - pkg/orderbook/...
        - pkg/matching/...
      duration: 1h

For critical vulnerabilities requiring immediate attention:

24/7 Security Hotline: +1-888-LUX-SEC1
Emergency Email: [email protected]

Response SLA:
- Critical: 1 hour acknowledgment, 24 hour response
- High: 4 hour acknowledgment, 72 hour response
- Medium: 24 hour acknowledgment, 1 week response